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Abstract 
This paper aims at analysing the performances of the EU member states in the Europe 2020 
Strategy and understanding the main factors of success. It builds on the Europe 2020 Index 
developed in Pasimeni (2011) to quantify and measure progress achieved by the twenty-seven 
countries in pursuing the objectives of the strategy and extends the calculation of the index to 
seven years. The results suggest that institutional factors are more relevant than macroeconomic 
indicators of public finances, such as GDP growth, levels of government debt and deficit, as 
success factors in the strategy. This applies to both formal institutions, such as good governance, 
rule of law, and control of corruption, as well as informal ones, such as social capital. This 
analysis has been conducted at national level; a regional breakdown of the data would enhance its 
validity. From a policy perspective, these findings suggest that the current emphasis on public 
accounts as the main criteria to define structural reforms could be enhanced including a broader 
focus on institutions. 
Key words: Europe 2020; measurement; institutions; governance; social capital. 
JEL: A13; N44; O10; O43; Z13 
        March, 2012 
 
                                                 
1 The opinions expressed in this paper are the author's alone and do not reflect those of the European Commission. 
The author is grateful to Mikel Landabaso, the editor Panayiotis Ketikidis, and three anonymous referees for their 
helpful comments and suggestions. Errors and omissions however are entirely the author's responsibility. 
 2
1. Introduction 
The Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in the European Union 
(EU) was launched by the European Commission (EC) in March 2010 and approved by the 
Heads of States and Governments of the twenty-seven member states of the EU in June 2010. 
The new strategy is the result of a political decision intended to address the main structural 
challenges the EU faces and can be considered as the successor of the Lisbon strategy. It 
represents more a political priority than an analytical exercise, so the aim of this paper will be to 
understand the main factors of success in this strategy, more than to justify the choice of these 
priorities. 
 
The Commission's proposal for a 10-year development strategy aims at moving out of the crisis, 
avoiding "the reflex to try to return to the pre-crisis situation" and changing the model of 
development. Three priorities were identified as main pillars of this strategy: Smart growth – 
developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation; Sustainable growth – promoting a 
more resource efficient, greener and more competitive economy; Inclusive growth – fostering a 
high-employment economy delivering economic, social and territorial cohesion (European 
Commission, 2010).  
 
The Europe 2020 strategy sets out concrete targets to be achieved within the next decade in areas 
such as employment, education, energy use and innovation in order to overcome the impact of 
the financial crisis and promote economic growth. The key deliveries for the Europe 2020 
Strategy at national level are the so-called "National Reform Programmes" (NRPs), which are to 
be presented by the national governments in April of each year, along with the stability and 
convergence programmes2. NRPs contain national targets relating to EU-wide headline targets 
and explain how governments intend to meet them and overcome obstacles to growth. They also 
set out what measures will be taken, when, by whom and with what budget implications. 
 
In this framework, new policy instruments for performance benchmarking (Huggins, 2010), such 
as composite indicators specifically developed for the Europe 2020 Strategy (Pasimeni, 2011), can 
be useful for the quantification, measurement, monitoring and evaluation of the strategy. The 
objective is to avoid some weaknesses of the Lisbon strategy, the growth strategy for the 
European Union in the last decade (2000-2010), whose weaknesses have been related (Saltelli et 
al, 2011) to the inappropriate use of statistical indicators, not used in the context of an advocacy 
programme in support of the EU policy.  
 
This paper builds on the index developed in Pasimeni (2011) to quantify, measure and monitor 
the progress achieved by the twenty-seven member states of the EU towards the achievements of 
the objectives set by the new strategy and aims at identifying the critical factors of success for this 
strategy. The structure of the index is maintained, some elements of its calculation are modified, 
in order to ensure a better consistency over time, and the analysis is enhanced covering seven 
years instead of three. The index is then be used to identify the main factors which determine the 
differences in performances among countries. Section 2 of the paper presents the methodology 
used; section 3 presents an analysis of its external validity; section 4 applies the new tool to 
                                                 
2 Produced annually by countries of the euro-zone (stability programmes) and other EU countries (convergence 
programmes) under the Stability and Growth Pact. The aim is to ensure more rigorous budgetary discipline through 
surveillance and coordination of budgetary policies. In line with the European Semester designed to coordinate 
economic policy-making in EU countries, the programmes are submitted simultaneously with national reform 
programmes in April each year, thus before government adoption of national budgets for the following year, and will 
provide for meaningful discussions on fiscal policy. 
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examine the critical factors affecting the strategy; section 5 focuses on the role of institutions; and 
finally section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The index 
The "Europe 2020 Index", as proposed in Pasimeni (2011), is based on three thematic sub-
indices representing the three dimensions of growth identified as main pillars of the strategy. 
These in turn are built on a set of eight indicators agreed and approved by the Heads of States 
and Governments of the twenty-seven member states of the EU. These indicators are calculated 
at national level by Eurostat3 , some of them have quite long time series available, since the early 
nineties, but others only cover a more limited time span. This paper uses a more complete set of 
data, allowing the construction of the index for seven instead of three years. The eight official 
indicators to monitor the Europe 2020 strategy are: 
 
- Tertiary education attainment      (TEDU) (2000-2010) 
- Gross domestic expenditure on R&D     (GERD) (1990-2009) 
- Greenhouse gas emissions       (GGE)  (1990-2009) 
- Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (RNEW) (2003-2009) 
- Energy intensity of the economy      (EINT) (1990-2009) 
- Employment rate of the population aged 20 to 64        (EMPL) (1992-2010) 
- Early leavers from education         (SCHO) (1992-2010) 
- Population at-risk-of-poverty or exclusion     (POV)  (2003-2010) 
 
The structure of the index is maintained, linking each indicator to only one dimension of the 
strategy, as in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the Index 
 
 
 
The data used are extracted by Eurostat and at the moment the largest common period for which 
all of them are available is from 2003 to 2009, being the shortest time series for the RNEW 
indicator. Table 1 provides the summary statistics for these indicators4 showing the mean over 
the available time periods, the standard deviation, minimum and maximum values.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Available at: ( http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/europe_2020_indicators/headline_indicators ) 
4 Data from Eurostat, last extraction: 05 Jan 2012. 
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  Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the indicators used 
 
Variable mean sd min max 
TEDU 30.10 10.67 8.90 49.90 
GERD 1.46 0.92 0.25 3.92 
GGE 96.06 32.84 40.00 193.00 
RNEW 11.09 9.90 0.10 47.30 
EINT 310.96 227.08 104.69 1207.91 
EMPL 68.05 6.14 50.80 81.10 
SCHO 17.21 10.40 4.10 54.40 
POV 25.29 10.11 13.90 64.50 
 
The normalisation method for the eight indicators remains the same, by applying: 
 
 
X ic = }{x min - }{x max
}{x min - x
ikkikk
ikkic  and  X ic = }{x min - }{x max
 x- }{x max
ikkikk
icikk , 
 
 
where i is the indicator, c the country, and max k and min k are the maximum and minimum values 
of that indicator across the whole period available. These values, however, are different from the 
previous version of the index: the choice has been made to used absolute higher and lower 
bounds among the data available for all the countries, even non EU, across the full time series.  
 
The comparability over time of the index, across many years, will be easier and more 
"sustainable", reducing the probability that some value for EU countries reaches the absolute 
historical maximum or minimum. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the normalised 
values, presenting the mean over the available time periods, the standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum values: 
 
 
  Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the normalised indicators 
 
Variable mean sd min max 
TEDU 0.53 0.25 0.035 1.000 
GERD 0.32 0.24 0.008 0.946 
GGE 0.65 0.20 0.062 0.988 
RNEW 0.17 0.15 0.001 0.728 
EINT 0.90 0.10 0.495 0.992 
EMPL 0.60 0.13 0.308 0.853 
SCHO 0.79 0.17 0.089 0.992 
POV 0.77 0.17 0.130 0.962 
 
 
Three thematic indices can be created by grouping these indicators, reflecting the three main 
pillars of the Europe 2020 strategy: the Smart Growth Index (SMGI), the Sustainable Growth 
Index (SUGI), and the Inclusive Growth Index (INGI), which in turn form the Europe 2020 
Index. The normalised indicators are aggregated with a geometric mean using equal weights 
(Ebert and Welsch, 2004; OECD, 2008), as in Pasimeni (2011), to build the three thematic 
indices and the final one. The following tables present the values and the rankings of the twenty-
seven member states in each of the new thematic indices for each year, from 2003 to 2009: 
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Table 3: Values and rankings in the Smart Growth Index (SMGI) 
 
 
 
  Table 4: Values and rankings in the Sustainable Growth Index (SUGI) 
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  Table 5: Values and rankings in the Inclusive Growth Index (INGI) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 presents the scores of the new Europe 2020 Index for each country in each year with the 
relative ranking. It is worth underlying that all countries have improved their score from 2003 to 
2009, even though the 2009 performances were already influenced by the consequences of the 
economic and financial crisis. The effects of the crisis on the dimensions of this index are likely 
to be stronger for the following year, 2010, especially for the Inclusive Growth dimension. 
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  Table 6: Values and rankings in the Europe 2020 Index 
 
 
 
 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark are, in this order, the top performing countries each year. The 
biggest improvements in the ranking of the twenty-seven member states between 2003 and 2009 
were those of Portugal (from the 21st to the 16th position), Poland (from 22nd to 19th), and Estonia 
(from 10th to 7th). In most of the cases we observe an increase in absolute values of the index for 
each country, only in very few cases the performance lowers. The two most significant cases of 
reduction in the value of the index are observed for Romania and Latvia in the year 2009 
compared to 2008: the first sees a reduction of 0.011 points, the second, even bigger, of 0.039 
points.  
 
This might be an expected result, due to the effects of the crisis on the policies put in place, and 
by taking a closer look at the three components of the strategy, we can disaggregate this effect. In 
both cases the decrease is explained by the strong deterioration of their performances in the 
inclusive dimension (INGI) and in the smart growth one (SMGI), while at the same time their 
sustainable growth index (SUGI) was still improving. 
 
This Index offers an opportunity to perform quantitative assessments of the Europe 2020 
Strategy, and might be used to explore which factors are more decisive for its improvement. The 
next section compares this measure with the other main indices available in the literature, 
analysing different facets of development. We then study the correlation between this measure of 
the strategy and the main indicators of economic development or the main institutional 
dimensions of good governance, to assess their relative relevance.  
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3. External validity of the index 
In this section the index is compared to other selected indices available in the literature, which 
rank countries according to their performance in a certain dimension. In particular the section 
extends the analysis of globalisation and competitiveness in relation to the Europe 2020 Strategy, 
in order to understand to what extent these are positive factors for the strategy, and how this 
relation evolves over time. 
 
The KOF Index of Globalisation (Dreher 2006, Dreher et al. 2008) is a composite index, based 
on the thematic sub-indices of economic, social and political globalisation, which aims to 
measure the levels of globalisation of more than 190 countries 5. The data available for this 
composite index only cover the period until 2008, and we can observe that the correlation 
between the Europe 2020 Index and each of the three dimensions of globalisation is positive, but 
moderate. 
 
What is extremely relevant in this comparison is that the correlation between the Europe 2020 
performance, as measured by the Index, and the level of globalisation, as measured by the KOF 
one, is clearly decreasing every year. This holds true for each one of the specific sub-indices 
composing the Globalisation Index, as shown in Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of correlations between Europe 2020 Index and Globalisation Indices (same years) 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 It defines globalization as the process of creating networks of connections among actors at multi-continental 
distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital and goods. 
Globalization is conceptualized as a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, 
technologies and governance and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence. More specifically, the three 
dimensions of the KOF index are defined as: economic globalization, characterized as long distance flows of goods, 
capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges; political globalization, 
characterized by a diffusion of government policies; and social globalization, expressed as the spread of ideas, 
information, images and people. It uses a linear aggregation method. 
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The graph shows that while in 2003 the two performances were highly correlated (r=.697; 
ρ=.769), implying that more "globalised" member states clearly had better performance in those 
dimensions which now form the Europe 2020 Strategy, this is less and less valid in 2008 (r=.479; 
ρ=.527). The explanation for this clear tendency might be that even though the twenty-seven 
member states of the EU constitute a quite homogeneous group of countries with very similar 
degrees of social, political and economic globalisation, for those which joined the EU only in 
2004 (and 2007) this might have been taken some time. 
 
The declining relevance of the differences in the degree of openness (as measured by the 
Globalisation Index) could reflect the process of integration within the EU. In other words, once 
the twenty-seven member states share the same broad economic, political and social aquis as 
members of the EU, they do not differ much from each other in terms of openness to the rest of 
the world. It will be interesting to see if this tendency continues over the following years. 
 
The World Economic Forum publishes each year a Global Competitiveness Report, in which 133 
economies are ranked according to a Global Competitiveness Index (GPI)6, which tries to 
measure the set of institutions, policies and factors that set the sustainable current and medium-
term levels of economic prosperity, in order to assess "the ability of countries to provide high 
levels of prosperity to their citizens. This in turn depends on how productively a country uses 
available resources" (Schwab et al. 2010). 
 
The advantage of this index as a good test for the Europe 2020 Index is that it includes a very 
large number of indicators, classified by thematic areas (pillars), from institutions, infrastructures, 
education, to macroeconomic environment, health, markets functioning, technology and 
innovation, and aggregated with a linear method. Its comprehensiveness makes it a good 
benchmark for the Europe 2020 Index. 
 
Figure 3: Europe 2020 and Global Competitiveness Index 
 
                                                 
6 The index is built on 90 variables, of which two thirds come from the Executive Opinion Survey, and one third 
comes from publicly available sources such as the United Nations. The variables are organized into nine/twelve 
pillars, with each pillar representing an area considered as an important determinant of competitiveness. The GCI 
separates countries into three specific stages: factor-driven, efficiency-driven, and innovation-driven, each implying a 
growing degree of complexity in the operation of the economy. The GCI applies a linear aggregation method. 
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The Global Competitiveness Index is strongly correlated with the Europe 2020 one (ρ=.749), this 
correlation also has a very high degree of linearity (r=.801), and is robust (significance level = 
99.9%). These results suggest that the Europe 2020 strategy, as it has been presented and 
according to the indicators chosen for its quantification, measurement and monitoring, is 
perfectly consistent with the overall concept of competitiveness, as defined by the Global 
Competitiveness Index, and that competitiveness is one of the key factors of success in the 
strategy. 
 
4. Critical factors affecting the Europe 2020 strategy 
This section tries to identify those factors which are more decisive for the Europe 2020 Strategy, 
factors that can explain the differences in performances of the member states, as measured by the 
Europe 2020 Index. In order to do this, the main macroeconomic indicators together with other 
institutional factors relevant for development, proposed in the literature, are compared to the 
Index. 
 
The main macroeconomic indicators of the public accounts are analysed to understand how 
relevant they are for the performance of the member states in the Europe 2020 Strategy. The 
analysis performed here will try to shed some light on whether having a sound macroeconomic 
and fiscal profile guarantees better performance in the Europe 2020 strategy.  
 
The Europe 2020 index is positively related to good economic performance, as measured by 
GDP per capita. This correlation however is not very strong. Levels of GDP, measured in 
purchasing power standards, compared to the average for the twenty-seven member states of the 
EU, are positively correlated to the Europe 2020 Index (Pearson's = .352, Spearman's = .598). 
These values tell us that there is a positive correlation, but its linearity is not so strong. The 
analysis of the relationship between GDP growth and levels of the Europe 2020 Index show no 
correlation at all (r= -.168; ρ= -.252) and this is valid across the whole time series. 
 
In the framework of the European Monetary Union, member states agreed to avoid excessive 
budgetary deficits. Under the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact, they agreed to respect 
two criteria: a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60%, and a deficit-to-GDP ratio of 3%. If a country exceeds 
the deficit ceiling the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) is triggered at EU level. However, when 
the excess of the government deficit over the 3% threshold is considered temporary, no sanction 
is applied. 
 
The first measure, the level of national public debt of member states, as measured by the general 
government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP, is not at all correlated with the 
Europe 2020 strategy, and this is valid for all the available years, from 1995 to 2010, compared to 
all the values of the Europe 2020 Index for the years from 2003 to 2009. Pearson's and 
Spearman's coefficients values are comprised between + 0.150 and – 0.150. This suggests that 
keeping low debt is not necessarily conductive to good performance, in terms of the Europe 
2020 strategy, and on the other side that increasing public debt, per se, does not facilitate any 
improvement. 
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Figure 4: Europe 2020 and Government Debt 
 
 
The measure of government deficit is a measure of the difference between the revenue and the 
expenditure of the general government sector. This indicator shows a positive correlation with 
the Europe 2020 Index (r= .379; ρ= .384), which is, however, very limited. 
 
Other factors, however, could better explain the differences in performances of the member 
states in the Europe 2020 Strategy, as measured by our Index. Institutions, in the sense of 
"humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions" (North, 
1991), are often recognised as important conditions for development. This applies to both formal 
and informal institutional settings. Being Europe 2020 a broad strategy for development, it seems 
reasonable to test whether and to what extent different measures of governance available in the 
economic literature can explain the critical factors for such a strategy to be successful. 
 
In this section the main indicators and indices of good governance available in the literature, as 
measures of formal institution, are analysed to understand whether and to what extent they 
represent necessary preconditions for the Europe 2020 strategy to be successful. Then the role of 
social capital, as example of informal institutions, is also analysed. 
 
The World Bank has developed the Worldwide Governance Indicators project (Kaufmann et al, 
2010), aiming at synthesising different dimensions of good governance in six main indices: Voice 
and accountability, Political stability and absence of violence or terrorism, Government effectiveness, Regulatory 
quality, Rule of law, and Control of corruption 7. They measure the quality of governance in over 200 
countries, and are updated on an annual basis since 2002. These are "positive" indices, meaning 
that higher values correspond to better performances. The coefficients of correlations (Pearson's 
and Spearman's) between each of these indices and the Europe 2020 Index, in each year from 
2003 to 2009, are presented in the following table:  
                                                 
7 The indicators are a compilation of the perceptions of different groups of respondents, collected in large number of 
surveys and cross-country assessments of governance. Some of these instruments capture the views of firms, 
individuals, and public officials in the countries being assessed. Others reflect the views of NGOs and aid donors 
with considerable experience in the countries being assessed, while others are based on the assessments of 
commercial risk-rating agencies. 
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Table 7: Matrix of correlations (Pearson's and Spearman's) between Europe 2020 Index and Quality of 
Governance indices 
 
Indices Europe 2020 Index 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
r =.613 r =.705 r =.688 r =.631 r =.618 r =.610 r =.653
Voice and accountability 
ρ =.647 ρ =.696 ρ =.675 ρ =.624 ρ =.654 ρ =.641 ρ =.711
r =.308 r =.547 r =.472 r =.478 r =.429 r =.313 r =.412Political stability, 
absence of violence ρ =.342 ρ =.534 ρ =.468 ρ =.482 ρ =.491 ρ =.369 ρ =.458
r =.761 r =.799 r =.762 r =.721 r =.687 r =.655 r =.735
Government effectiveness 
ρ =.806 ρ =.755 ρ =.755 ρ =.708 ρ =.720 ρ =.700 ρ =.761
r =.652 r =.665 r =.633 r =.546 r =.572 r =.557 r =.611
Regulatory quality 
ρ =.710 ρ =.678 ρ =.645 ρ =.565 ρ =.618 ρ =.587 ρ =.632
r =.648 r =.722 r =.689 r =.622 r =.623 r =.590 r =.641
Rule of law 
ρ =.716 ρ =.750 ρ =.731 ρ =.684 ρ =.699 ρ =.696 ρ =.724
r =.759 r =.801 r =.777 r =.721 r =.708 r =.677 r =.747
Control of corruption 
ρ =.788 ρ =.806 ρ =.794 ρ =.700 ρ =.676 ρ =.664 ρ =.798
 
All these measures of good governance are positively correlated with the Europe 2020 Index and 
this is valid each year from 2003 to 2009. We can observe in the following figure how important 
these factors are, and how this relevance is also increasing, in particular in the last year (2009) for 
which we are able to build our index. 
 
 
Figure 5: Evolution of correlations Europe 2020 Index / WB Governance Indicators (same years) 
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In some cases this correlation is extremely strong, linear and robust. Government effectiveness, Control 
of corruption and Rule of Law are the dimensions which best explain the Europe 2020 Index, much 
better than the public accounts indicators. The linear regressions show a strong correlation in 
both cases, even stronger if measured by the Spearman's coefficient, a non-parametric coefficient, 
which is less sensitive about the outliers (in these cases Malta and Cyprus). In all three cases the 
statistical tests of significance show a probability of type-one error below 0.1%, meaning a 
significance level of 99.9% for these correlations. 
 
The first indicator has been built to measure perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, and to which the 
state mainly serves elites and private interests. The Control of Corruption one tries to capture the 
perception of the quality of public services, of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government's commitment to such policies. The latter captures perceptions of the extent 
to which people have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. 
 
The strict correlation between these measures and the Europe 2020 Index is extremely interesting 
and very much in line with the hypothesis of good governance as the main pre-requisite for an 
effective implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy. This factor is often underestimated in 
developed countries, but these results show how it makes the difference when it comes to 
assessing a broad development strategy which goes beyond the simple measures of economic 
growth.  
 
Figure 6: Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness' correlations with Europe 2020 
 
 
 
Another well-known measure of corruption can be tested in order to corroborate how relevant 
good governance is, and in particular the control of corruption, as a decisive factor in deploying 
successful public policies even in more developed countries. The Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI), published by Transparency International (2010) each year since 1995, ranks the countries 
of the world according to "the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public 
officials and politicians". This index is based on a linear aggregation method of several indicators. 
The organization defines corruption as "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain". It gives a 
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comprehensive picture of corruption in the countries analysed by combining a number of 
different indicators of corruption into one index, and is a "positive" index, i.e. a higher score 
means less corruption. 
 
The analysis of correlations shows that countries with a higher Europe 2020 Index are precisely 
those with a higher CPI, i.e. with lower levels of corruption. Figure 7 shows this positive and very 
strong correlation (Pearson = .782; Spearman = .840; significance: 99.9%) of the Index with the 
CPI, suggesting that levels of corruption in a country is a good predictor of the capacity of this 
country to achieve the Europe 2020 objectives and is indeed a relevant threaten to the strategy.  
 
 
Figure 7: Europe 2020 and Corruption Perception Index 
 
 
It had already been demonstrated that levels of corruption are negatively correlated with levels of 
investments and expenditures on education (Mauro, 1995) and that corruption opportunities may 
be less abundant on education than on other components of government expenditure (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993), but this strong correlation between the Europe 2020 Index and the CPI is 
particularly important, since it substantiates the idea that good governance may determine the 
overall success of such a broad development strategy. 
 
These results suggest that EU countries must constantly keep under control the levels of 
corruption, not just for the seek of ethical and moral objectives, but also for the attainment of 
their development objectives. We can observe how institutional factors of good governance, like 
levels of corruption, rule of law and effectiveness of governments are more decisive than the 
traditional macroeconomic indicators of public finance to achieve the objectives of the Europe 
2020 Strategy, as shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Europe 2020 Index correlation with Public Accounts & WB Governance Indicators (same years) 
 
 
 
 
This result is quite relevant from a policy perspective, especially taking into account the current 
emphasis on public accounts as the main criteria to define structural reforms in the EU. If 
institutional factors are as relevant as fiscal consolidation for the pursuing of the objectives of the 
Europe 2020 Strategy, or even more as these results suggest, then the agenda for structural 
reforms might be enhanced, including a broader focus on institutions. 
 
5. Institutions and the Europe 2020 strategy 
The analysis presented in the previous section highlights the role of formal institutions, as 
measured by the indicators of good governance, for the achievement of the Europe 2020 
objectives. Corruption, in particular, seems to be the single most important factor. This result has 
been corroborated by two different measures, namely the World Bank's Control of Corruption 
indicator, and the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. 
 
The literature on corruption and on its relation with development (Rose-Ackerman, 1975) has 
emphasised several channels trough which it has adverse effects on economic growth (Bardhan, 
1997), on investments (Mauro, 1995), on inequalities and poverty (Gupta et al, 2001), on 
education (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), explaining the incentive structure that may favour the 
diffusion of corrupted actions in the society. Corruption has negative effects on the effectiveness 
and on the efficiency of the use of the resources deployed to foster economic development; it 
acts as a clamp on the whole economic system and may determine the success or failure of 
development strategies, such as the Europe 2020 one. 
 
There is a certain current of thought among economists, called "free-market libertarians" by 
Rose-Ackerman (2010), which has tried to associate the levels of corruption with the size of 
governments (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Becker, 1995; Banerjee, 1997; Alesina and Angeletos, 
 16
2005). In Becker's (1995) words "if you want to cut corruption, cut governments", because bigger 
governments raise the opportunities for corruption. According to Alesina and Angeletos (2005) 
"the larger the resources controlled by the government, or the more extensive the regulation of 
the market, the larger the scope for corruption and rent seeking", and on this basis they claim 
that "government intervention fosters corruption and injustice". Also Banerjee (1997) explicitly 
models bureaucracy and corruption, reaching the conclusion that "a significant part of what we 
see as government failures may exist even when a government has the best of intentions and is 
subject to no special sociological constraints". 
 
For the purposes of this analysis, it can be interesting to see whether the strict correlation 
between the Europe 2020 Index and the control of corruption also implies a negative correlation 
with the size of the government in the member states, as suggested by the "free-market 
libertarians" hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, control of corruption and the CPI, which 
are "positive" measures of corruption (the higher the value, the lower the corruption level) 
should have a negative correlation with the size of government, in the twenty-seven member 
states. Consequently, the Europe 2020 Index should also be negatively correlated with the same 
indicator of size of government. 
 
The OLS regression analyses seem to contradict this hypothesis, showing instead a positive 
correlation. This correlation is also moderately strong, both in the case of Control of Corruption (r = 
.600; ρ = .585), and for the Corruption Perception Index (r = .589; ρ = .576). This has also been valid 
over the previous years: 
 
 
Figure 9: Correlations with Size of Government (same years) 
 
 
 
 
These results suggest that in the European Union those countries where the size of the 
government is bigger, meaning that general government expenditures have a higher share on 
GDP, tend to be those with a better control over corruption. This should imply a positive 
correlation between the Europe 2020 Index and the size of government, which is in fact 
confirmed by the following Figure: 
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Figure 10: Europe 2020 and Size of Government 
 
 
The Europe 2020 Index is not negatively correlated with the size of government; on the contrary 
the relation is quite positive. The hypothesis of size government being the main incentive for 
corruption seems not to hold true in the case of the EU, even though government expenditures 
are not exempt from mismanagement and misbehaviours. The point is that limiting the scope of 
the problem to a merely quantitative account of the opportunities for corruption, instead of 
focussing on the quality and capacity of the state intervention and on the necessary accountability 
mechanisms, might be superficial. The analysis of the impact of corruption on the economy and 
of its underlying causes should probably be more accurate. 
 
Informal institutional factors can further contribute to shed some light on the performances of 
EU countries in the Europe 2020 Strategy, as measured by the Europe 2020 Index. The role of 
social capital has been considered for this analysis. In the most recent economic literature on 
economic development the notion of social capital is increasingly emphasised as a factor 
determining economic performances. Just like other forms of capital (physical, financial, human) 
it is considered a facilitator for the economic activities, contributing at both microeconomic level 
(with its ability to improve market functioning) and macroeconomic level (affecting the global 
organisation of production). To some extent, it has become a concept for defining ‘the missing 
ingredient’ in successful practice that economics cannot explain (Landabaso et al, 2007). 
 
Most of the definitions of social capital highlight components like norms, values, voice, feelings 
of trust, solidarity and reciprocity, which enable better social interactions, coordination, 
networking and organisational capacity that in turn act as facilitators of the economic activity. It 
is a sociological and psychological concept having certain relevance for economic development. 
One of the most common proxies for social capital is a measure of generalised trust, provided by 
the World Value Survey indicator "most people can be trusted" (Inglehart et al, 2011). This 
indicator is available for the twenty-seven member states of the EU, across different periods. 
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The OLS regression shows one of the strongest linear correlation with the Europe 2020 Index 
(Pearson = .750; Spearman = .637; significance: 99.9%), as in Figure 11. The linear regression 
coefficient (Pearson) is one of the highest found in the analysis, highlighting the role of social 
capital as determinant for the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
 
Figure 11: Europe 2020 and Social Capital 
 
 
This substantiates the relevance of social capital for development, in particular for the objectives 
pursued by the Europe 2020 strategy in the EU. Even though this correlation does not 
automatically imply a causal relation between the two measures, the fact that the measure of 
social capital is a weighted aggregate covering several periods (from the 1980s to 2005), and that 
the Europe 2020 Index values are those of 2009, may justify a prudent inference of causal 
relations. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has developed a study of the Europe 2020 Strategy by improving the Europe 2020 
Index and applying it to the analysis of the critical factors of success for the strategy. The external 
analysis of the index confirms that competitiveness is an important element of the strategy, as the 
extremely strong correlation with the Global Competitiveness Index indicates. Levels of 
globalisation, instead, are decreasingly relevant in explaining the differences among the member 
states of the EU, suggesting that a certain convergence is taking place in the degree of openness. 
 
The analysis shows that institutional factors are more decisive to achieve the objectives of the 
Europe 2020 Strategy than macroeconomic indicators of public accounts, such as GDP growth, 
levels of government debt and deficit. This is true for formal institutional factors of good 
governance, such as levels of corruption, rule of law and effectiveness of governments, as well as 
for informal institutions, such as social capital.  
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This result is relevant from a policy perspective, due to the present emphasis on public accounts 
as the main criteria to define structural reforms in the EU. If institutional factors are as relevant 
as fiscal consolidation for the pursuing of the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy, or even 
more relevant, as these results suggest, then the agenda for structural reforms could be enhanced, 
including a broader focus on institutions. 
 
The costs of corruption are often underestimated in developed countries, but these results show 
that they must constantly be kept under control since they are determinant for the 
implementation of development policies in the member states of the EU. The analysis of the 
impact of corruption on the economy and of its underlying causes should probably be more 
accurate. Corruption has negative impacts on the effectiveness and on the efficiency of the use of 
the resources deployed to foster economic development; it acts as a clamp on the whole 
economic system and may determine the success or failure of development strategies, such as the 
Europe 2020 one.  
 
The analysis of informal institutions suggests that social capital has indeed a relevant role for this 
strategy, substantiating what has often been argued in the recent economic literature, that it is a 
critical factor of success for development.  
 
The paper also aims to create basis for further research. In particular, further analysis could be 
conducted, if we were able to gather data at regional level for the eight indicators composing the 
index. This could provide us with more meaningful and robust insights on the key success factors 
of the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
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